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INTRODUCTION
This Article was written in the midst of renewed national debate on the
wisdom and usefulness of a ban on openly gay1 men and women serving in
*
J.D., cum laude, Vermont Law School, 2007. The author is the law clerk for the
Honorable Joel E. August at the Second Circuit Court of Hawai`i. The author thanks
Alex Manning for her love, inspiration, and honorable service, and Professors Greg
Johnson and Stephen Dycus for their support and guidance. This Article is dedicated to
the gay and lesbian service members currently in the U.S. Armed Forces.
1. The word “gay” or “homosexual” throughout this Article is all-inclusive and
refers to gay men, lesbians, and bisexual men and women.
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the armed forces. The law known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue,
Don’t Harass” (“DADT”) was passed in 1993 after controversial debate on
the issue.2 It was a compromise between a new president and a Congress
controlled by the opposite party. DADT codified what was once merely
Department of Defense policy. The outcome satisfied few.
When George W. Bush announced the beginning of the “war on terror”
shortly after September 11, 2001,3 and deployed troops in Afghanistan and
Iraq in the following years, the ban on gay service members took on new
significance and received more attention. Six years later, the war in
Afghanistan has been largely forgotten or ignored and the war in Iraq is
increasingly unpopular. Recruitment numbers are down,4 and yet the
president called for a troop “surge” to fight the growing insurgency and its
escalating violence.5 A ban on anyone who is qualified and desires to serve
the country seems unreasonable, if not downright silly.
Circumstances and facts that foreshadow the law’s demise also
undermine the justifications given years ago to support it. Challenges in
the courtroom continue. Several retired, high-level military officers,
including some originally in favor of the ban, publicly recanted their earlier
positions and called for its end.6 Editorials in national and local
2. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
3. See David E. Sanger & Don Van Natta, Jr., After the Attacks: The Events; In

Four Days, a National Crisis Changes Bush’s Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001;
Elaine Sciolino, After the Attacks: The Overview; Long Battle Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2001 (noting that while addressing the military, Bush warned all members of the
military to be ready to respond to the terrorist attacks).
4. See Mark Thompson, Broken Down, TIME, Apr. 16, 2007, at 28.
The Army has been lowering standards to meet enlistment goals, taking on
more dropouts and even convicted felons. Recruiters face a bigger challenge
as they to permanently add 65,000 troops . . . .
....
. . . The army will be short about 3,000 midlevel officers for the next few years
and faces critical gaps in such key areas as military intelligence. And suicides
in the ranks have been climbing.
Id. See also Harry Levins, In Visit Here, Army Recruiting Chief Lays Out the Numbers,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2007, at A2 (“In the fiscal year that ended
September 30, [2006] the Army made its goal of 80,000 recruits albeit just barely”);
Julian E. Barnes & Peter Spiegel, Expanding the Military, Without a Draft, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2006, at A18 (“After struggling in 2004, the Army missed its recruiting target
in 2005. To meet its recruiting goal of 80,000 new soldiers in 2006, the Army was
forced to loosen rules for those they were willing to accept”); Thom Shanker, Army and
Other Ground Forces Meet ‘06 Recruiting Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at A19
(reporting that active duty recruitment goals were met for Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
Air Force, and reserve forces recruitment goals were met for Marine Corps Reserve and
Air Force Reserve, but numbers fell slightly short of Army National Guard, Army
Reserve, Navy Reserve, and Air National Guard recruitment goals).
5. See President George W. Bush, President’s Address to the Nation (Jan. 10,
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/200701107.html.
6. See Audrey Denson & Judy G. Rolfe, Momentum: After Ten Years, a Growing
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newspapers around the country agree.7 Majority popular opinion in the
military and the general public regarding homosexuality has been positive
and accepting.8 Internationally, several western or western-supported
nations ended their bans on openly gay service members with no negative
effect.9 Along with the unabashedly discriminatory nature of the policy,
these facts indicate that the law’s end is near. In fact, Representative Marty
Meehan (D-Mass.) recently introduced legislation to overturn the ban on
gay service members.10
I offer one additional perspective on the policy. The Executive branch
could end the ban, at least temporarily, in the name of national security
under statutory authority. The authority results from the state of national
emergency existing since September 2001. The President could sign an
executive order that suspends DADT and its implementing regulations. In
addition to statutory authority, the Executive’s position as Commander-inChief of the armed forces grants broad authority for an order of this sort.
Courts over the past fourteen years have deferred to Congress and military
judgment in holding DADT constitutional. The judiciary also defers to the
Executive in matter of national security, especially in times of war.11
Courts also traditionally employ the political question doctrine to refrain
from deciding disagreements between Congress and the Executive on
wartime policy. This judicial deference makes challenging an executive
order difficult and unlikely to succeed. Therefore, the Executive branch
could effectively overturn the ban if Congress does not actually rescind the
Movement For Freedom, Service Members Legal Def. Network, http://www.sldn.
org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/1450.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2007)
(noting that two generals, an admiral, and thirteen other retired senior military leaders
have found “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to be ineffective).
7. See id. (observing that the New York Times, The Washington Post, USA
Today, The Chicago Tribune, The New Orleans Times-Picayune, and The Los Angeles
Times, among others, take the side of allowing lesbian, gay, and bisexual service
members).
8. See id. (finding that in a December 1993 public opinion poll, seventy-nine
percent of Americans supported allowing lesbian, gay, and bisexuals to serve openly in
the armed forces).
9. See id. (realizing that many of America’s allies, as well as the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security
Agency, have dropped their bans on gay and bisexual personnel in the war on
terrorism).
10. The Service Members Legal Defense Network, or SLDN, is a nonprofit
advocacy organization dedicated to overturning DADT and ending discrimination and
harassment of military personnel affected by it. SLDN lobbied on Capital Hill in
March 2007 in support of Rep. Meehan’s bill, with some degree of success. See
Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 1246, 110th Cong. (2007) (noting
that, as of October 8, 2007, the bill had 131 cosponsors).
11. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir. 1998) (elaborating
that the reliance by Congress on the professional judgment and testimony of military
experts and personnel in concluding that homosexual acts would compromise the
effectiveness of the military is not necessarily irrational).
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law.
The first part of this Article examines the historical and political contexts
of DADT, and includes a description of the law itself. Next, I look at the
myriad of constitutional challenges to the law under the Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses of the Fifth Amendment, and First Amendment
free speech clauses. In the third part, I summarize where the policy stands
today, politically and socially. Lastly, I outline the national security
approach in which the Executive could engage to effectively, if
temporarily, overturn the ban. I also describe problems and potential
challenges to this approach. My conclusion makes predictions about the
policy’s future in the current political climate.
BACKGROUND
I. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”
Gay men have served in the military as far back as the American
Revolution.12 Until around World War I, no military laws or regulations
existed on same-sex sexual conduct.13 In 1916, the first military law
appeared in the Articles of War, which prohibited sodomy as criminal
conduct.14 During World War II, a flat-out prohibition on gays serving in
the military came into being.15 Official administrative policy since World
War II declared that homosexuality was incompatible with military
service.16
William Jefferson Clinton, on the campaign trail in 1992, promised to
end discrimination against homosexuals in the military.17 When he won the
presidency, this promise was one of the first he attempted to implement.
Initially, he issued an executive order, as an interim policy, that disallowed

12. Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, A Ban by Any Other Name: Ten Years of
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 403 (2004); see Sexual
Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Policy Options and Assessment, Nat’l
Def. Research Inst. (2004) [hereinafter Sexual Orientation] (asserting that the first
widely-cited instance of a “gay discharge” was when Lieutenant Enslin was dismissed
from the Continental Army).
13. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 405 (explaining that prior to military law
regulating same-sex sexual conduct, civilian law addressed sodomy); Sexual
Orientation, supra note 12 (noting that the Articles of War addressed sodomy within
the military population).
14. Alexander, supra note 12, at 405.
15. Id. at 406.
16. Id.; S. REP. NO. 103-112, § 263, at 200 (1993).
17. See Clinton Attacks Bush on Family Health Issues: Democrat Calls Perot
“Wrong” on Gays, S.F. CHRON., May 30, 1992, at A1 (citing a Pentagon study that
says there is no evidence that allowing homosexual people in the military will lead to
any problems); Ronald Brownstein, Clinton Addresses 600 at Rally of Gays, Lesbians,
L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at 24.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss1/2

4

Lundquist: Essential to the National Security: an Executive ban on "Don't As

2007]

AN EXECUTIVE BAN ON “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”

119

questioning prospective recruits about their sexual orientation.18 He then
called upon his Secretary of Defense to create an executive order
modifying the existing ban, which was written in Department of Defense
Directives.19 In response to President Clinton’s efforts and galvanized by
strong, public opposition to any change by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Congress began its own investigation.20 After multiple congressional
hearings on the issue, Congress created the law known as “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell.”21 The hearings were weighted heavily in favor of the military
and its then-prevailing view that homosexuality was incompatible with
military service.22 The Senate and House committees also disregarded
reports commissioned by the Department of Defense and the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”), which concluded that integration of gays
into the military was possible.23
Justifications for the anti-gay policy shifted over the years. For example,
military leaders in the past have erroneously believed that homosexuals
were more prone to blackmail.24 Because homosexual acts often were
prohibited criminally, the belief went, homosexuals would be susceptible to
blackmail if successfully seduced, and thus could be coerced into revealing
military secrets or intelligence.25 Similarly discriminatory beliefs that
18. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 408.
19. See id. (noting that two bills were offered to modify the ban on gays in the

military: the first bill would have required the President to submit to Congress any
change to existing policy on homosexuals in the military; the second bill would have
required the Secretary of Defense to review department policy and submit
recommendations to the President); see also DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1304.26,
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION (Feb. 5,
2004) [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF., QUALIFICATION STANDARDS] (establishes the
qualification standards for enlistment, appointment, and induction into the armed
forces); DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE
SEPARATIONS (Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF., ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE
SEPARATIONS] (outlining that a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual conduct is
grounds for separation from the armed forces); DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE NO. 1332.30,
SEPARATIONS OF REGULAR AND RESERVE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (Mar. 14, 1997)
[hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF., SEPARATION OF OFFICERS] (noting that it is Department of
Defense policy to judge the suitability of persons to serve in the Armed Forces on the
basis of their conduct).
20. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 408-09.
21. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) (stating that an individual will be separated from
the armed forces if the individual states that he or she is homosexual or bisexual, or if
the individual engages in, attempts to engage in, or solicits another to engage in a
homosexual act).
22. S. REP. NO. 103-112, § 263, at 200 (1993) (listing in detail the military and
Department of Defense witnesses and merely mentioning that “the committee received
testimony for the record from numerous private citizens and organizations”).
23. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-200, § 575, at 190 (1993); S. REP. NO. 103-112 (1993).
24. See RICHARD A. POSNER, Discrimination Against Homosexuals, With
Particular Reference to Military Service, in SEX AND REASON 314-15 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1992).
25. See id. (claiming that this argument is weak, because only a small percent of
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homosexuals were effeminate, physically incapable of performing, or
mentally unstable also prevailed.26
As these justifications proved untrue, new ones took their place.27 The
three most current justifications are that the prohibition on homosexual
conduct promotes unit cohesion, enhances privacy, and reduces sexual
tension.28 Current and past justifications are simply covers for anti-gay
discrimination, which was demonstrated recently by Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, who was quoted in the Chicago Tribune
as saying that he believed homosexuality was “immoral,” and that DADT
should remain in effect.29
II. DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL
The law itself is relatively simple and straightforward. It begins with
fifteen findings regarding the unique nature of military life30 and why
homosexual conduct is unacceptable in it. First of all,

the military personnel have access to military secrets). The fact that female spies might
just as successfully seduce married enlisted men or officers and subsequently blackmail
them apparently never arose.
26. Id.; Sexual Orientation, supra note 12 (indicating that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and other military leaders believed that allowing homosexuals in the
military would undermine unit cohesion and performance).
27. See Sexual Orientation, supra note 12 (citing experiences of analogous
institutions, such as foreign militaries and fire and police departments, to disprove
negative assumptions about homosexuals in the military).
28. See DEP’T OF DEF., ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS, supra note 19
(describing the Department of Defense’s logic behind their decision to prohibit
homosexuals from serving in the military).
The presence of [homosexuals] adversely affects the ability of the armed
forces to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and
confidence among service members; to insure the integrity of the system of
rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of
service members who frequently must live and work under close conditions
affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the armed force; to
maintain the public acceptability of military service and to prevent breaches of
security.
Id. See also Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d, 155
F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir. 1998).
29. Aamer Madhani, Don’t Drop “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Pace Says, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 13, 2007, at 1.
30. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(8) (2007).
Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that (A) the
extraordinary responsibilities of the armed forces, the unique conditions of
military service, and the critical role of unit cohesion, require that the military
community . . . exist as a specialized society; and (B) the military society is
characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including
numerous restrictions on personal behavior, that would not be acceptable in
civilian society.
Id.
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[s]uccess in combat requires military units that are characterized by high
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion. . . . that is, the
bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat
effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat
effectiveness of the individual unit members.31

Because the U.S. military may be deployed anywhere in the world for
“actual combat . . . members of the armed forces [may have to]
involuntarily . . . accept . . . forced intimacy with little or no privacy.”32
Two assertions and a conclusion follow:
The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of
military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances
of military service. The armed forces must maintain personnel policies
that exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would create an
unacceptable risk to the armed forces’ high standards of morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military
capability.
The presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would
create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military
capability.33

Thus, homosexuals detract from unit cohesion, weaken the armed forces
and therefore they may be banned.
The following section outlines three bases for investigating a service
member’s sexual orientation. If a finding is made that a service member
has
(1) . . . engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage
in a homosexual act or acts . . . (2) . . . stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect . . . [or] (3) . . . married
or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex,

then that person “shall be separated from the armed forces under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.”34 Separation is
mandatory upon finding (1), unless there are five further findings35 that
essentially rebut the presumption that the service member is a homosexual.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at (a)(6)-(7).
Id. at (a)(12).
Id. at (a)(13)-(15).
Id. at (b).
Id. at (b) (1)(A)-(E) (“further findings . . . that (A) such conduct is a departure
from the member’s usual and customary behavior; (B) such conduct, under all
circumstances, is unlikely to recur; (C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of
force, coercion, or intimidation; (D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the
member’s continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interest of the
armed forces in proper discipline, good order, and morale; and (E) the member does not
have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.”).
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Separation is also mandatory upon finding (2), unless a further finding is
made that the member has “demonstrated that he or she is not a person who
engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends
to engage in homosexual acts.”36 If a service member marries or attempts
to marry a person of the same sex, separation is mandatory without an
opportunity for any further findings.37 The burden of proof remains on the
service member throughout the proceeding, according to implementing
regulations.38 Each branch of the service makes its own regulations.39
Challenges to DADT’s constitutionality began immediately after its
passage.40 No federal appellate court has found the law unconstitutional,
however. These cases are described in the following section.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”
The focus of this Article is not whether DADT is constitutional, a topic
which has been discussed widely elsewhere. Therefore, this section only
briefly summarizes the case law on constitutional challenges to DADT to
provide some context for the reader. Particular attention will be paid to the
36. Id. at (b)(2).
37. Id. at (b)(3).
38. See DEP’T OF DEF., ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS, supra note 19

(stating that the service member will have an opportunity to rebut the presumption the
he or she engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to
engage in homosexual acts); DEP’T OF DEF., SEPARATION OF OFFICERS, supra note 19.
39. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, AR NO. 635-200, ACTIVE DUTY ENLISTED
ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS, at 15-2b(1) (2005) (citing the Army’s discharge
policy, which allows for a soldier to avoid separation if the purpose of the homosexual
conduct was to avoid military service or if the retention of the soldier is in the interest
of national security); DEP’T OF THE NAVY, Separation by Reason of Homosexual
Conduct, in MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL, ch.11, § 1910-148 (2005) (noting that a
member of the Navy may avoid separation by demonstrating that the homosexual acts
were a departure from the member’s usual behavior, that such acts are unlikely to recur,
and that the acts were not accomplished with the use of force, coercion, or
intimidation); SEC’Y OF THE AIR FORCE, AFI NO. 36-3208, ADMINISTRATIVE
SEPARATION OF AIRMEN, § 5.43 (2004), available at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil
(allowing for a rehearing when there is newly discovered evidence or a discovery that
the prior finding was based upon fraud or collusion); U.S. MARINE CORPS, MARINE
CORPS SEPARATION AND RETIREMENT MANUAL § 6207 2a (2000) (clarifying that a
Marine shall be separated for engaging in homosexual conduct, unless the acts are not
customary for the member, the acts are unlikely to recur, and the member does not have
a propensity to engage in homosexual acts).
40. See, e.g., Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1430 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that a
discharge did not violate the First Amendment right to free speech, when the individual
previously engaged in homosexual acts, and intended to engage in sexual acts in the
future); Thorne v. United States Dep’t of Def., 916 F. Supp. 1358, 1368 (E.D. Va.
1996) (allowing a person to make a statement that he or she is gay without creating an
irrebutable presumption that he or she is gay); Thomasson v. Perry, 895 F. Supp. 820,
831 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 80 F.3d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that “Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell” does not violate the Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act);
Richenberg v. Perry, 909 F. Supp. 1303, 1316 (D. Neb. 1995) (holding that Air Force
policy regarding homosexuality did not violate an officer’s First Amendment rights).
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doctrine of judicial deference to military judgment because it is central to
many of the holdings and relevant to my proposed executive order.
Constitutional challenges to DADT are fairly straightforward and most
often based on the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fifth
Amendment.41 Several First Amendment claims have been raised, both as
alternative pleadings and as the sole claim in a case.42 Under substantive
due process, the argument goes, sexual activity between consenting adults
is protected by a “fundamental liberty interest in private adult consensual
intimacy and relationships, including . . . relationships between adults of
the same sex.”43 Therefore, DADT violates a homosexual’s right to
privacy because it “infringe[s] upon and deprive[s homosexuals] of that
liberty interest” without a compelling, important, or even legitimate
government interest in doing so.44 The equal protection argument has two
basic premises. First, homosexuals should be recognized as a protected
class and therefore courts must subject DADT to strict scrutiny.45
Alternatively, the law violates equal protection because homosexuals are
treated differently for committing the same acts that heterosexuals do.46
The free speech argument is that the law impermissibly restricts speech
based on content.47
Courts across the nation have upheld DADT. The law does not violate
the First Amendment because it “does not target speech declaring
homosexuality; rather, it targets homosexual acts and the propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts, and permissibly uses the speech as
evidence.”48 As for the Fifth Amendment challenges to DADT, courts
have found consistently both that homosexuals are not a suspect class and
41. See Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392 n.7 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting
that although the Fifth Amendment does not contain the Fourteenth Amendment phrase
“equal protection of the laws,” the equal protection concept has been found to apply to
the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process guarantee and
provides the same protections as the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection).
42. See, e.g., Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1372 (recognizing an individual’s claim that
appearing on an ABC news program and telling viewers that he is gay, then later being
dismissed from the Navy for the statement, violates the First Amendment right to free
speech); Richenberg, 909 F. Supp. at 1306 (citing First Amendment and Equal
Protection right violations as bases for his challenge against the military’s policy
regarding homosexual soldiers).
43. Cook, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 392.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988),
reh’g 875 F.2d 699, 731 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (reversing and holding for plaintiff
on more narrow grounds); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 864 (E.D.N.Y.
1997), rev’d, 155 F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir. 1998).
46. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1432-41 (9th Cir. 1997).
47. See, e.g., Thorne, 916 F. Supp. at 1372.
48. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 931 (4th Cir. 1996).
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that there is no fundamental liberty interest that protects homosexual sex.49
Under rational basis review, the law is constitutional because it is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest.50 The government’s interest in
keeping the military ready is legitimate.51 Because preserving unit
cohesion is vital to a ready, high-functioning military, and the military said
that homosexuals ruin “unit cohesion,” prohibiting homosexual conduct by
service members is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.52
The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas53 changed the
legal status of homosexual rights, though in exactly what ways remains
unclear. The Court did not articulate the standard it applied to reach its
holding that a Texas law criminalizing sodomy was unconstitutional.54 The
case overturned the prior precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick,55 in no uncertain
terms. “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct
today. . . . Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”56 Since
the holding of Bowers was that there is no “fundamental right [of]
homosexuals to engage in sodomy,”57 one could argue that the holding of
Lawrence is the opposite—that there is a fundamental right to engage in
sodomy, as a private, consensual activity between adults. There is also a
credible argument that the Supreme Court applied heightened scrutiny,
therefore implying that homosexuals are a suspect class. If Lawrence
stands for the proposition that homosexuals are a protected class, then strict
scrutiny would apply to DADT since it targets homosexuals. DADT has
been found unconstitutional under the highest standard of review, but those
cases have been overturned on appeal.58 There have been only three
challenges to DADT since 2003 and none of the federal district courts
49. See id. at 928.
50. See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 635 (“[W]e cannot say that the reliance by Congress

on the professional judgment and testimony of military experts and personnel that those
who engage in homosexual acts would compromise the effectiveness of the military
was irrational.”).
51. See id. at 634 (accepting that the government’s interest in promoting unit
cohesion, enhancing privacy and reducing sexual tension justified prohibiting
homosexual conduct).
52. See id. at 635 (crediting General Colin Powell’s statement that allowing an
openly homosexual individual to join a small unit will destroy the bonding that is
crucial for survival in times of war).
53. See 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
54. Id. at 578 (holding that private life within the home deserves respect and
therefore government cannot restrict private sexual activity that occurs there).
55. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that state sodomy laws are valid).
56. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
57. 478 U.S. at 190.
58. Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988), reh’g 875
F.2d 699, 731 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 864
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d on appeal, 155 F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir. 1998).
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found DADT unconstitutional based on Lawrence.59
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO MILITARY JUDGMENT
Nearly every court that upheld DADT employed the doctrine of judicial
deference to military judgment. The doctrine directs courts to grant broad
deference to military judgments that Congress relied on when passing
legislation.60 Simply stated, courts are “not free to disregard the
Constitution in the military context, [but they] owe great deference to
Congress in military matters.”61 While courts often refer to this theory as a
“traditional” doctrine, it is, in fact, a relatively recent development in
judicial jurisprudence.62 The doctrine is premised on the fact that military
life is fundamentally different from civilian life, which justifies restrictions
on certain individual rights that would not be tolerated outside the military
context.63 In practice, the doctrine allows courts to employ something less
than rational basis review because deference “gives the judiciary far less
scope to scrutinize the reasons, legitimate on their face, that the military
has advanced to justify its action.”64 Courts also have employed the
doctrine when reviewing executive actions regarding the military.65 A
59. See Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 517 (2005) (holding that DADT
does not implicate a fundamental right and thus is only subject to rational basis
review); United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (laying out a three-part
test to apply Lawrence when considering the constitutionality of U.C.M.J. Art. 125,
which criminalizes sodomy when committed by either homosexual or heterosexual
service members and ultimately finding the sodomy law constitutional); see also Cook
v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (D. Mass. 2006); Witt v. United States Dep’t of
the Air Force, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1148 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
60. See Loomis, 68 Fed. Cl. at 520-21 (including an excerpt from General Colin
Powell’s testimony to Congress on the importance of unit cohesion in the military, and
how allowing openly gay soldiers to serve may disrupt cohesion).
61. Able, 155 F.3d at 633-34.
62. See Rotsker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981) (deferring to Congress’s
decision to require only men to register for the draft); see also Diane H. Mazur, A
Blueprint for Law School Engagement With the Military, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 473, 487-98 (2005) (offering an in-depth analysis of the development of the
military’s doctrine of supporting women registering for the draft); Diane H. Mazur, Is
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Unconstitutional After Lawrence? What It Will Take to
Overturn the Policy, 15 J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423, 431-36 (2004) (making the point that
civilian control over the military will largely disappear if the judiciary abdicates its role
to review constitutional questions in the military context); cf. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d
1420, 1432-41 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (criticizing vehemently the
doctrine of judicial deference to military judgment in the context of the “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy on the grounds that it violates homosexual service members’ equal
protection).
63. See Able, 155 F.3d at 633 (giving examples of military law restrictions on
criminal trial, First Amendment and freedom of religion rights).
64. Id. at 634.
65. See id. at 633 (emphasizing that deference by the Court to Congress and the
Executive in military-related decisions has been the reason for rejecting various
challenges to military policies); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944)
(deferring to Congress’s power during a time of military urgency, World War II, to
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court would employ judicial deference when reviewing a challenge to an
executive order suspending enforcement of DADT. This is explored
further in Part IV.
ANALYSIS
I. “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL” IN 2007
Two significant differences exist between the United States of 1993 and
of 2007. First, the terrorist attacks of 2001 created an entirely unfamiliar
sense of fear and vulnerability in Americans and led to a renewed respect
for those protecting our safety.66 Additionally, the military has been called
upon to fight a new kind of war, against a somewhat abstract and
untraditional enemy.67 Second, social attitudes towards homosexuality
have become more positive and accepting in the thirteen years since
DADT.68 Together, these two developments create a new context for the
law, one in which DADT is unlikely to survive.
A few days after September 11, 2001, President Bush announced the
United States’ entry into the “war on terror,” which increased demand for
service members in our all-volunteer army.69 He assured the American
people that the campaign would be long, and would require sacrifices.70 In
addition, our armed forces would be called upon to fight overseas, to
prevent the terrorists from attacking the United States again.71 The
President sent the military into Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, to oust the
Taliban and capture Osama bin Laden.72 Then, on March 20, 2003, the
United States invaded Iraq in order to overthrow dictator Saddam
Hussein.73 Despite the president’s premature declaration of “mission
accomplished” two months later, the conflict in Iraq continues in 2007.74
order the segregation of the Japanese-American population).
66. See Sciolino, supra note 3.
67. See id. (quoting President George W. Bush after the attacks of September 11,
characterizing the fight against terrorism as a long and sustained battle against various
networks of terrorist organizations).
68. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 432 (commenting that 2003 Gallup polls
indicated that not only has there been greater support for gays in the military by the
American public, but also that there seems to be improving attitudes about gays from
inside the military).
69. See Barnes & Spiegel, supra note 4, at 18.
70. See Sciolino, supra note 3.
71. Id.
72. CNN, Afghanistan Wakes After Night of Intense Bombings, Oct. 7, 2001, http://
archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/gen.america.under.attack/index.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Afghanistan Wakes].
73. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, President’s Radio Address, Mar. 22, 2003, available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/ releases/2003/03/20030322.html.
74. Maura Reynolds & Anna Gorman, After the War: Bush Hails Victory in Iraq,
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The president’s new strategy in Iraq calls for a surge of over 20,000
additional combat troops.75 He has little support from Democrats in
Congress, some Republican disagreement with the approach, and growing
public dissatisfaction with the situation.76 With the war’s popularity
declining steadily, recruitment is difficult across all branches of the
service.77
II. GAYS SERVE IN THE MILITARY
The military historically retains gay service members in times of actual
conflict, from the Korean War to Vietnam to the current crises.78 In 1994,
the year after implementation, the United States discharged just over 600
members under DADT.79 Over the next six years, the number of annual
discharges steadily increased, reaching almost 1300 in 2001.80 In 2002 and
2003, the discharges dropped to 885 and 770, respectively.81 That
represents a thirty percent decrease after the Afghanistan invasion and a
forty percent decrease—compared to discharges prior to the Afghanistan
operation—after Operation Iraqi Freedom began.82
L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A2 (characterizing President Bush’s speech aboard the
USS Abraham Lincoln as giving an optimistic assessment of the war in Iraq).
75. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 28 (stating that General Abizaid, former
commander of the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, warned Congress that the military
would not be able to sustain a 20,000 troop surge in Iraq; however, once General
Abizaid departed as commander, President Bush ordered a troop increase of 30,000).
76. See id.
77. See id. (stating that the Army has had to lower recruiting standards, partially by
accepting more high school dropouts and convicted felons, to meet enlistment goals).
78. Conduct Unbecoming: The Tenth Annual Report on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,
Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass, in 2004 SERVICE MEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK 1
[hereinafter Conduct Unbecoming] (stating that in 2003, the Pentagon discharged the
lowest number of gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members since 1995); see also
Press Release, Service Members Legal Defense Network, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
Dismissals Decline to Record Low (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://www.sldn.org/
templates/press/record.html?section=2&record=3656.
79. DAVID F. BURRELLI & CHARLES DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Rep. No.
RL30133, HOMOSEXUALS AND U.S. MILITARY POLICY: CURRENT ISSUES 11 (Feb. 10,
2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2005/meta-crs6146.tkl.
80. See id.
81. See id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL:
FINANCIAL COST AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD’S HOMOSEXUAL
CONDUCT POLICY CANNOT BE COMPLETELY ESTIMATED 8 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05299.pdf [hereinafter GAO, COSTS AND LOSS OF
CRITICAL SKILLS] (publishing slightly different numbers from the CRS report, supra
note 81, likely because GAO did not include some types of service in their totals, such
as Reservists with less than 31 days of deployment); Conduct Unbecoming, supra note
78, at 1 (listing discharge figures for 2002 and 2003 at 909 and 787, respectively, based
on Department of Defense reporting).
82. See Audrey Denson & Judy Rolfe, Historical Timeline of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass,” Service Members Legal Def. Network, available at
http://www.sldn.org/binary-data/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/1449.pdf.
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The Pentagon has denied consistently that it retains gay service members
during wartime and subsequently discharges them when the conflict ends.83
A 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report supported this
assertion.84 The report compared the number of discharges from 1980 to
2003 as a percentage of the active force, and concluded that if the
Department of Defense “was using ‘Stop Loss’ to retain homosexuals
during [the 1991 Persian Gulf War], we would have expected to see a drop
in the wartime discharge rate followed by an increase following the crisis.
Such an increase, or ‘post-crisis purge,’ is not evident in these data.”85
However, it is impossible to speculate about a “post-crisis purge” under
DADT until the current conflict ends, assuming that it ever does and that
DADT remains in effect for the duration of the conflict. Also, one
researcher criticized the CRS’s methodology, claiming that it averaged the
discharge rates in order to hide the clear pattern of lower discharges during
war.86
Recently, however, the Michael D. Palm Center discovered direct
evidence contradicting the Pentagon87 in the course of researching a news
story.88 The organization discovered a 1999 “Reserve Component Unit
Commander’s Handbook” which indicated that if a unit has received alert
notification—i.e., notice that the unit will be deployed, discharge for
homosexual conduct is not authorized.89 These regulations are still in
83. See Press Release, Michael D. Palm Center, Researchers Locate Army
Document Ordering Commanders Not to Fire Gays: Regulations Seem to Contradict
Pentagon Denial That Military Retains Gays During War (Sept. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/researchers_locate_army_document_ord
ering_commanders_not_to_fire_gayshttp://www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/res
earchers_locate_army_document_ordering_commanders_not_to_fire_gays [hereinafter
Michael D. Palm Center, Researchers Locate].
84. See BURELLI & DALE, supra note 79, at 12.
85. See id.
86. NATHANIEL FRANK, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SEXUAL MINORITIES IN THE
MILITARY UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA, RESEARCH NOTE ASSESSING
‘HOMOSEXUALS AND U.S. MILITARY POLICY: CURRENT ISSUES,’ A CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1, July 6, 2005, available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt (“Gay discharges have fallen during
wartime for every American war since World War II, the first time records were
kept.”); see also RHONDA EVANS, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SEXUAL MINORITIES IN
THE MILITARY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA, U.S. MILITARY POLICIES
CONCERNING HOMOSEXUALS: DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES, 5
(2001), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/publications/dadt/u_s_military_policies
_concerning _homosexuals).
87. See Michael D. Palm Center, http://www.palmcenter.org/ (last visited Oct. 7,
2007).
88. See Michael D. Palm Center, supra note 83; see also Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Out
Gay Soldiers Sent to Iraq, WASH. BLADE, Sept. 23, 2005 http://www.wash
blade.com/2005/9-23/news/national/outiraq.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2007)
(commenting that the Palm Center found the 1999 FORSCOM while assisting ABC
television for a story on Nightline about gays in the military).
89. See Michael D. Palm Center, supra note 83; FORSCOM, DEP’T OF THE ARMY,

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss1/2

14

Lundquist: Essential to the National Security: an Executive ban on "Don't As

2007]

AN EXECUTIVE BAN ON “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL”

129

effect. If the military retains gay service members during times of conflict,
only to separate them later under DADT, that practice would seriously
undermine the current “unit cohesion and good morale” policy justification.
Arbitrary and uneven enforcement of the regulations further undermines
the “unit cohesion” rationale.90 Whether the law is enforced at all
apparently depends on the commanding officer’s discretion.91
The policy’s justification in fact is undermined because gay service
members currently serve in the military—some openly. Many of the
challenges to DADT have been brought by gay service members who have
distinguished service records. Courts have praised their honorable service,
whether upholding or overturning the law.92 In addition, the Urban
Institute estimates that 36,000 gay men and lesbians were on active duty in
2000, and that number jumps to 65,000 when including the guard and
reserve.93 The report also estimates that there are one million gay veterans
in the United States.94 Brigadier Generals Keith Kerr and Virgil Richard,
and Admiral Alan Steinman, all retired, are the highest-ranking service
members to publicly announce their homosexuality.95 These service
members’ contributions demonstrate that gay men and women do not
necessarily have the feared negative effects on unit cohesion and morale.
What is more, top military leaders now publicly oppose DADT,
including some of those who originally supported it.96 Most recently,
Army General John M. Shalikashvili announced his change of heart in a
FORSCOM REG. 500-3-3, FORSCOM MOBILIZATION & DEPLOYMENT PLANNING
SYSTEM: VOLUME III RESERVE COMPONENT UNIT COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK (1999).
90. See generally NATHANIEL FRANK, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SEXUAL
MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA, GAYS
AND LESBIANS AT WAR: MILITARY SERVICE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN UNDER “DON’T
ASK, DON’T TELL” 34-38 (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://www.palmcenter.org
/press/dadt/releases (arguing that the policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is ambiguous
and also that commanders often ignore reports of homosexual subordinates because
they do not want to lose troops).
91. See id. at 38 (concluding that selective enforcement of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
creates an atmosphere where certain soldiers may feel that they are targeted
specifically).
92. See Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 505 (2005) (explaining that
Loomis received a Purple Heart and Bronze Star Medal for his service in the Vietnam
War).
93. GARY J. GATES, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY: ESTIMATES FROM CENSUS 2000 iii (2004), available at http://www.urban.org
/publications/ 411069.html (accounting for 2.5 and 2.8% of military personnel,
respectively).
94. See id. at iv (indicating that the states with the highest gay and lesbian veteran
population are California, Florida, Texas, New York, and Georgia).
95. See John Files, Gay Ex-Officers Say “Don’t Ask” Doesn’t Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2003, at A18.
96. See John. M. Shalikashvili, Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at A1.
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New York Times editorial.97 Now retired, General Shalikashvili was the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Clinton from 1993-1997.98 As
Chairman, he supported the ban because he believed that changing the
policy would be “too burdensome for our troops and commanders,”
deferring to the “longstanding view that homosexuality was incompatible
with [military] service.”99 But now, he wrote, “the military has changed,
and [] gays and lesbians can be accepted by their peers.”100 He cited social
science for support. A 2006 Zogby poll showed that seventy-five percent
of 500 service members returning from Iraq and Afghanistan were
comfortable interacting with gay people.101 The general pointed to other
nations’ experiences with allowing openly gay people to serve and noted a
need for new recruits in the continuing war on terror.102 Other prominent
members of the military and Executive Cabinet also have spoken out.103
There have been numerous social science studies on the policy, its
implementation, and its effects on the military. These studies have been
done by nonprofit organizations,104 the GAO,105 the Congressional
Research Service,106 and the Pentagon and Department of Defense.107 All
come to essentially the same conclusion: gay service members present no
97. See id. (stating that the military has been stretched thin from the deployments in
the Middle East and anyone willing and able to go to war should be welcomed).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. ZOGBY, BRUCE, WITTMAN, & RODGERS, ZOGBY INT’L, OPINIONS OF MILITARY
PERSONNEL ON SEXUAL MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY 20 (Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.palmcenter.org/ files/active/1/ ZogbyReport.pdf.
102. See Shalikashvili, supra note 96, at A1 (mentioning that twenty four nations,
including Great Britain and Israel, have allowed gays to serve openly in the military
and have not reported problems of morale or recruitment).
103. SERVICE MEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, WHY REPEALING “DON’T ASK,
DON’T TELL IMPROVES THE U.S. MILITARY, http://www.sldn.org/binarydata/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/3195.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2007) (including
MCPOCG Vincent W. Patton III, USCG (Ret.), former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Lawrence Korb, the late former Navy Secretary and Senator John Chafee, and former
Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Dorn).
104. See Michael D. Palm Center, http://www.palmcenter.org/ (last visited Oct. 7,
2007); Service members Legal Defense Network, http://www.sldn.org (last visited Oct.
7, 2007); Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
105. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DOD’S
POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY (1992), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d33t10
/146980.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT:
STATISTICS RELATED TO DOD’S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY (1992), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d33t10/146967.pdf;
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY: POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149440.pdf; GAO, COSTS AND LOSS
OF CRITICAL SKILLS, supra note 81.
106. See BURRELLI & DALE, HOMOSEXUALS AND MILITARY POLICY, supra note 79.
107. See, e.g., GAO, COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS, supra note 81.
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long-term negative effect on military unit cohesion, or morale.108
Many reports highlight the law’s negative effects on the military. For
example, the GAO concluded that, at the very least, the cost of recruiting
replacements for service members separated under the policy was about
$95 million over a ten-year period.109 Training costs added at least another
$95 million.110 Additional costs, not reflected in the $95 million, included
inquiries and investigations, counseling and pastoral care, separation
functions, and discharge reviews.111 A Blue Ribbon Commission convened
by the University of California, Santa Barbara to look into this report
concluded that the total cost to taxpayers was $363.8 million, which is
about ninety-one percent higher than the GAO estimate.112
DADT has also cost the military man- and womanpower by both
discharging service members and barring recruits. This has a negative
impact on military readiness. According to the Pentagon, more than 10,000
service members have been separated since the law’s inception.113 The law
also has disqualified an untold number of talented and willing Americans
from serving their country. Of those separated, over two hundred of them
have been linguists training in the languages needed most right now,
Arabic, Farsi, and Korean.114 Considering the low recruitment numbers
and missed recruitment goals that the military is facing currently, this poses
a serious threat to military readiness.115
Congress is in the best position to overturn DADT because it can repeal
the law. In 2005, Rep. M. Meehan (D-Mass.) introduced the Military

108. See generally Lou Chibbaro Jr., ‘Open Gays’ Can Serve Military Well, Study
Says, WASH. BLADE (Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.sldn.org/templates
/press/record.html? section=5&record=445.
109. GAO, COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS, supra note 81, at 29.
110. Id. at 14-5.
111. Id. at 15-6 (acknowledging that costs for these services include a portion
related to homosexual conduct but that the military does not keep track of the specific
amount that is delegated for that purpose).
112. FRANK J. BARRETT ET AL., BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL:” HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? (Feb. 2006),
available at http://www.palmcenter.org/files/active/0/2006-FebBlueRibbonFinalRpt.
pdf.
113. See GAO, FINANCIAL COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS, supra note 81, at
8; see also Press Release, Michael D. Palm Center, Experts Debate Likely Effects of
Lifting Gay Ban (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.palmcenter.org/press/
dadt/releases/ (finding that recruitment of straight people may not decline if the gay ban
were overturned).
114. See GAO, COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS, supra note 81, at 21 tbl. 2.
115. See Barnes & Spiegel, supra note 4, at A18 (noting that the Army has been
accepting more enlistees scoring in the lowest percentile on the military aptitude test to
meet its recruiting goals); Shanker, supra note 4, at A19 (reasoning that the cash
bonuses received by recruits upon enlistment likely enabled all branches of the military
to meet their recruitment goals for the 2006 fiscal year).
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Readiness Enhancement Act (“MREA”), with 122 co-sponsors.116 In
March, 2007, Mr. Meehan re-introduced the bill as the MREA of 2007,
with 109 co-sponsors .117 The MREA’s sole purpose “is to institute in the
Armed Forces a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”118 The MREA expressly repeals 10 U.S.C. § 654 and
establishes a detailed policy, prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from
discriminating “on the basis of sexual orientation against any member of
the armed forces or against any person seeking to become a member of the
armed forces.”119 Discrimination is defined as “the taking of any personnel
or administrative action—including any action relating to promotion,
demotion, evaluation, selection for an award, selection for a duty
assignment, transfer, or separation—in whole or in part on the basis of
sexual orientation.”120 For those seeking to become members of the armed
forces, “denial of accession . . . in whole or in part on the basis of sexual
orientation” also is considered discrimination.121 The Secretary of Defense
“may not establish, implement, or apply any personnel or administrative
policy, or take any personnel or administrative action . . . on the basis of
sexual orientation.”122 Section 4(e) also mandates that any person who had
been separated under DADT, “if otherwise qualified for re-accession into
the armed forces, shall not be prohibited from re-accession into the armed
forces on the sole basis of such separation.”123 Nothing in the Act creates a
private cause of action for damages,124 nor is it to be construed as
116. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-1059 (2005) (removing the DADT policy and
instituting a new policy of nondiscrimination).
117. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-1246 (2007). Five new House members co-sponsored
the bill within two weeks of its introduction, and the number has been climbing
steadily. As of June 25, 2007, the total number of co-sponsors was 126. See The
Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov. Additionally, Rep. Ellen
Tauscher (D.-Cal.) will become the lead sponsor of the bill in July, 2007, when Rep.
Meehan steps down to become chancellor of the University of Massachusetts, Lowell.
See Josh White, New Leader in Military Policy Battle, WASH. POST, June 15, 2007, at
A19 (discussing Rep. Tauscher belief that a Democratic president is necessary for the
bill to pass).
118. H.R. REP. NO. 110-1246, at § 2.
119. Id. §§ 3-4(a). (stating that the Secretary of Homeland Security also has this
authority with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the
Navy).
120. Id. § 4(b)(1).
121. Id. § 4(b)(2).
122. Id. § 4(c).
123. Id. § 4(d)-(f) (stating that this section does not prohibit the Secretaries from
“prescribing or enforcing regulations governing the conduct of members of the armed
forces if the regulations are designed and applied without regard to sexual orientation,”
and defines “sexual orientation” to mean “heterosexuality, homosexuality, or
bisexuality, whether the orientation is real or perceived, and includes statements and
consensual sexual conduct manifesting heterosexuality, homosexuality, or
bisexuality”).
124. Id. § 6.
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furnishing dependent benefits in violation of the Defense of Marriage
Act.125 Finally, the MREA requires that the Defense Secretary revise
Department of Defense regulations to conform to the new
nondiscrimination policy and to direct the Secretaries of each military
department to similarly revise their branch’s regulations.126
The bill was re-introduced in the midst of news announcing the
President’s planned troop surge in Iraq, calling for more than 20,000
additional deployments in the civil-war-torn nation.127 Then, two weeks
later, the Chicago Tribune quoted Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Peter Pace as saying that he believed homosexuality was
“immoral,” and that DADT should remain in effect.128 Several prominent
newspapers ran editorials drawing a connection between the ban on gay
service members and the call for troop increases.129 General Pace retracted
his remarks, saying that he should not have aired his personal views on
homosexuality, though he did not apologize.130 Politicians from both
parties condemned the remarks.131 Congressman Meehan called for an
125. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419-20 (1996)
(articulating that no state is required to recognize or provide any rights to a marriage
between two members of the same sex that occurred in a different state).
126. H.R. REP. NO. 110-1246, at § 7. This includes all equal opportunity and human
relations regulations, eliminating procedures for involuntary discharges based on sexual
orientation and adding regulations “governing victims’ advocacy programs to include
sexual orientation discrimination . . . for which members of the Armed Forces and their
families may seek assistance.” Id. § 7(a)(1)-(3).
127. See Steve Chapman, “Don’t Ask” Rule’s Serious Tradeoffs, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4,
2007, at 7 (asserting that the current DADT policy represents a disservice to
homosexuals and the military in a time when the armed forces are in need of more
troops); Andrea Stone, Bill Targets “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Medical Personnel Among
Dismissed Servicemembers, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2007, at 5A (“A Government
Accountability Office report in February 2005 found that at least 800 dismissed gay
service members had skills deemed ‘mission critical’ by the Pentagon.”).
128. Aamer Madhani, Don’t Drop “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Pace Says, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 13, 2007, at 1.
129. See id.; Old Prejudice Dishonors New Military Generation, USA TODAY, Mar.
14, 2007, at 10A (comparing the unfounded nature of the current discrimination against
homosexuals to prior military restriction on blacks and whites serving together);
Cynthia Tucker, Immorality: U.S. Abuse of Gays in Military, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 18, 2007, at B6 (observing the hypocrisy in DADT policy because during
wartime less servicemen are dismissed than in periods when no military conflict
exists).
130. See William Neikirk & Karoun Demirjian, Pace Takes Fire on Gays Remark,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, at 3.
131. Id. (mentioning how Democratic presidential candidates Senator Hilary Clinton
and Senator Barak Obama immediately criticized the general for making the remark,
but oddly did not immediately distance themselves from its content); see Lynn Sweet,
Editorial, How Obama, Clinton Tripped on Gay Rights, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007
(declaring that both candidates inadvertently stumbled by failing to directly answer the
question of whether homosexuality was immoral when initially asked); Brownback
Backs Pace Remark on Gays, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2007, at 5 (reporting that Republican
presidential candidate and Kansas Senator Sam Brownback supported the general).
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apology from General Pace.132 Less than one month after the General’s
remarks, President Bush supported DADT in a press conference.133
The sensational story brought gays in the military to the forefront of
national conversation, and gave some indication of the current political
temperature on the issue. Highly unscientific polling on CNN conducted
the day the story broke revealed an audience evenly split on whether gays
should be allowed to serve, though the “yes” answers prevailed by a slim
margin. SLDN and others argued that the General’s inappropriate
comments demonstrated the law’s true basis in prejudice and
discrimination.134 The issue clearly remains controversial. In fact, seeking
to avoid controversial Senate confirmation hearings, the Bush
administration declined to reappoint Gen. Pace as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in early June 2007.135 Defense Secretary Robert Gates
believed that the confirmation process would have focused on Gen. Pace’s
involvement in the Iraq conflict,136 however, a week before the official
announcement, people speculated that Gen. Pace stepped down in part
because of reactions to his comments on homosexuality.137
Despite Congress’s primary authority to repeal DADT, the president
could effectively overturn the ban if Congress did not, based on statutory
and constitutional authority as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces.138

132. See General Under Fire: Top Military Leader Expresses Regret but Doesn’t
Apologize for Calling Homosexuality “Immoral,” CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2007, at 3
(quoting Representative Meehan, who described General Pace’s statements as in
conflict with the current public and military opinion because the military is turning
away troops in order to support a policy of discrimination).
133. President George W. Bush, President Makes Remarks on the Emergency
Supplemental (Apr. 3, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2007/04/ (declining to reveal his personal beliefs on whether he considered
homosexuality immoral).
134. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
135. See Anne Flaherty, Senate Leader Criticizes Pace, Petraeus, NAVY TIMES, June
15, 2007, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2007/06/ap_senatecritics_070614 (last
visited Sept. 24, 2007); Kathleen Parker, Gen. Pace’s Collateral Damage,
SFGATE.COM, June 15, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file:/c/a/
2007/06/15/EDGKOP3GAT1.DTL (last visited Sept. 24, 2007) (noting Defense
Secretary Robert Gates’ statement that he believed Pace’s termination had nothing to
do with his performance, but rather that the circumstances made it necessary to let him
go).
136. Thom Shanker, Chairman of Joint Chiefs Will Not be Reappointed, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A1 (“I have decided that at this moment in our history, the
nation, our men and women in uniform, and General Pace himself would not be wellserved by a divisive ordeal in selecting the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”).
137. See Joshua Lynsen, General Who Called Gay Sex ‘Immoral’ to Retire, WASH.
BLADE, June 8, 2007, http://www.washblade.com/2007/6-15/news/national/10757.cfm
(last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
138. See 10 U.S.C. § 123(a) (2007).
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III. ESSENTIAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY: SUSPENDING THE BAN
THROUGH EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
Although Congress codified Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, the executive branch
has specific statutory authority to suspend the law’s enforcement, at least
temporarily.139 The president’s declaration of a national emergency in the
wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks triggered statutory authority that
specifically allows the president to suspend separation of commissioned
officers.140 The president also had the authority to suspend separation of all
other soldiers in the armed forces.141 These provisions, together with the
Commander-in-Chief powers, create executive authority to effectively
overturn the ban. The president could issue an executive order directing
the Secretary of Defense to suspend the regulations implementing DADT.
Past presidents exercised this authority in similar situations and for similar
ends.142 Traditional judicial deference to the Executive in matters of
national security, coupled with the political question doctrine, makes any
challenge to the order unlikely to succeed. Therefore, the Executive branch
could make an argument using national security to circumvent the ban on
gays in the military.
A. Constitutional Authority of Congress & the Executive Regarding the
Armed Forces
Both the legislative and executive branches share authority over the U.S.
armed forces. The Constitution delineates Congress’s responsibility with
much more detail than it does for the Executive.143 The constitutional
mandates that the Executive “be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States.”144 This clause is
colloquially known as the Commander-in-Chief powers. In contrast,
139. See id.
140. See id.; Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001)

(announcing in accordance with the requirements of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. § 1601 (1976), that President Bush declares a national emergency and intends
to invoke 10 U.S.C. § 123, allowing him to temporarily suspend any provision that
would separate a commissioned officer from the armed forces).
141. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2007).
142. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,250 (Aug. 7, 1995)
(proclaiming by executive order that when reviewing an individual’s application for a
position that requires access to classified information, the government can not take into
account sexual orientation).
143. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16 (providing Congress an extensive
list of powers, including the power to declare war, raise funds for the Armed Forces,
and create laws for disciplining military members), with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
(stating only that the president is the Commander in Chief, but failing to delineate what
powers the title entails).
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Congress has authority to
provide for the common defence . . .; define and punish . . . Offences
against the Law of Nations; declare War, . . . and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water; . . . raise and support Armies; . . . provide
and maintain a Navy; . . . [and] provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia.145

Congress also holds the proverbial purse strings, which includes
appropriations to the military,146 while the president must “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”147 This clause gives the president the
power to make regulations that implement the laws Congress passes, such
as the Department of Defense regulations implementing DADT. Thus,
Congress and the Executive together regulate the armed forces.
B. National Emergency Powers
The president also has the authority to declare national emergencies.148
The term national emergency is not well-defined by statute, but has come
to refer to sudden attacks, such as those that occurred on September 11,
2001, and natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. The National
Emergencies Act outlines the exclusive means for making such a
declaration and provides a termination date if the president does not
officially end the emergency.149 It also mandates that the president indicate
what power and authority he is activating in response to the crisis.150 There
are at least 160 legal provisions that could be activated by a national
emergency declaration.151
President Bush formally declared a national emergency three days after
the September 11, 2001, attacks on Washington and New York, which
remains in effect.152 He activated nine statutes, including 10 U.S.C. § 123,

145. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 10-16.
146. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 12-13 (allocating to Congress the responsibility to raise

funds for supporting the armies, but placing a two year limit on the use of funds).
147. Id. art. II, § 3.
148. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (1976); see HAROLD C.
RELYEA, CONG. RES. SERV., TERRORIST ATTACKS AND NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT
DECLARATIONS 1-6 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21017.pdf
(illustrating that prior to the passage of National Emergencies Act, presidents had
unfettered discretion to implement their emergency powers).
149. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (2007) (providing that the termination date be decided
either by joint resolution or by the date specified by the President in his proclamation).
150. 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2007).
151. See REYLEA, supra note 148, at 3 (citing DAVID M. ACKERMAN & RICHARD F.
GRIMMETT, CONG. RES. SERV., DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE: BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf.
152. See Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001) .
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in the subsequently issued executive order.153 This statute authorizes the
president, in time of war or national emergency, to “suspend the operation
of any provision of law relating to the . . . separation of commissioned
officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard
Reserve.”154 The suspension will remain effective until two years after the
last extension of the national emergency declaration, or until one year after
the termination of the war or national emergency, whichever occurs first.155
To summarize, the president has authority to regulate the military under his
constitutional Commander-in-Chief powers. In addition, he has the
authority to declare national emergencies in times of crisis. Congress
created standby statutory authorities triggered by a national emergency
declaration. Among these, is the power to suspend any law relating to the
separation of commissioned officers. When President Bush declared a
national emergency on September 14, 2001, he explicitly activated the
authority related to suspending separations.156 Thus, the president now has
statutory authority to suspend separation proceedings under DADT for
commissioned officers.
The president could exercise this authority by issuing an executive order
citing 10 U.S.C. § 123(a). The order could state that separation
proceedings against commissioned officers under DADT are suspended for
the duration of the national emergency.157 The order may also include a
brief explanation, indicating that national security depends on a strong
military, which needs all willing and able soldiers. Because the military
has not declared homosexuals unfit to serve, the need for bodies on the
ground would likely trump the unit cohesion issue.158
Although 10 U.S.C. § 123 applies only to commissioned officers, the
president has alternate statutory authority to suspend DADT regulations for
enlisted service members and non-commissioned officers in the reserves.
A stop-loss order is the most effective way to retain these service members.
Under 10 U.S.C. § 12305, the president may, “notwithstanding any other
provision of law,” suspend laws relating to the promotion, retirement, and
153. See Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201, at 48,201-02 (Sept. 14,
2001).
154. 10 U.S.C. § 123(a) (2001).
155. See id. § 123(b).
156. See Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (invoking 10 U.S.C. § 123
and various other provisions of the United States Code relating to the separation of
commissioned officers).
157. See 10 U.S.C. § 123.
158. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(8) (finding that military life is a specialized society and
the conditions of military service require cohesion within military units); see also
DEP’T OF DEF., SEPARATION OF OFFICERS, supra note 19 (ordering administrative
separation for officers with substandard performance or officers who have committed
misconduct).
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separation of “any [reserve component] member of the armed forces who
the President determines is essential to the national security of the United
States.”159 The law applies to reserve forces serving on active duty in
accordance with an order issued pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12302.160 Section
12302 states that “[i]n time of national emergency declared by the
President,” an authority designated by the Secretary of the service
concerned may order any unit or member to active duty for not more than
twenty-four consecutive months.161 These statutes create a similar chain of
authority as that under 10 U.S.C. § 123—the Commander-in-Chief powers
plus delegated statutory authority allows for an executive order suspending
enforcement of DADT separations.162 The legal reasoning is only slightly
different because the statutory language differs, but the effect is the same.
All of the services have issued a skill-based stop-loss order at least once
in the five and a half years since September 11, 2001.163 At the end of
2006, the Army National Guard and Reserves had 10,731 active soldiers
retained through stop-loss authority.164 According to the Army Times, the
Marine Corps discontinued the stop-loss policy and the Navy last used it in
April 2003.165
159.
160.
161.
162.

10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2007).
See id.
10 U.S.C. § 12302(a) (2007).
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 123 (2001) (allowing the president during times of war or
national emergency to suspend laws relating to the separation of commissioned
officers), with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (declaring the president the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces), and 10 U.S.C. 12305(a) (providing the president the ability to
suspend any provisions of law that cause the separation of any individual deemed
essential to national security during times when the reserve forces have been activated
under statutory authority).
163. See LAWRENCE KAPP, CONG. RES. SERV., OPERATIONS NOBLE EAGLE,
ENDURING FREEDOM, AND IRAQI FREEDOM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL, COMPENSATION, AND FORCE STRUCTURE 7 (2005), available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/meta-crs-8369.tkl (defining “stop
loss” as the exercise of the president’s authority to suspend separation of military
personnel for a period of time, and noting that none of the services currently have a
skill-based stop-loss policy in effect). The Army does have a unit-based stop-loss
policy for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, which it estimates will affect 36,700
soldiers during the current rotations for Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Id.
164. See Gordon Lubold & Matthew Cox, Minimize Stop-Loss, Gates Tells Service
Secretaries; Policy Currently Retains More Than 10,000 Soldiers, ARMY TIMES, Feb.
5, 2007, at 19 (suggesting that the Army will end the stop-loss when it reaches its goal
of 547,000 soldiers).
165. See id. (claiming that the Navy’s stop-loss policy prevented 480 sailors from
leaving the service). No information was available regarding any recent Air Force
stop-loss orders. See id. In late 2001, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve
implemented a stop-loss policy that affected all career fields through January 2002.
See Rod Hafemeister, Seena Simon & Val Gempis, Stop-loss; Advances in the War in
Afghanistan Mean Freeze in Retirements, Separations Could End in a Few Weeks, AIR
FORCE TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at GEN 1203 (describing how the stop-loss policy has
prevented Tech. Sgt. Ronald Williams from retiring from the Air Force even though he
is physically unable to perform his job).
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Administrative separations under DADT should continue despite stop
loss orders, according to military regulations.166 A stop-loss order does not
apply to most involuntary separations—such as those based on criminal
acts, or to regulations or policies that lead to involuntary separations.167
For example, the 2002 Marine Corps stop-loss order states that
“commanders will continue to separate marines for reasons of hardship,
physical disability, involuntary administrative separation, or violation of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).”168 The Army orders
specifically exempt certain types of separations from the stop-loss and
“discharge for homosexual conduct” is one exemption.169 The list of
exemptions refers to AR 635-200, the regulations covering DADT
However, another Army Reserve regulation tells
separations.170
commanders that if a unit has received alert notification, meaning that their
unit will be deployed, discharge for homosexual conduct is not
authorized.171
When confronted with the regulation, a military
spokesperson admitted that Reservists and National Guardsmen have been
sent to Iraq even though they have claimed to be gay, or were accused of
being gay.172 Apparently commanders have wide discretion regarding who
will be deployed.

166. See KAPP, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 163, at 7 (“[T]he adoption of
a stop-loss policy does not modify service polices or regulations which might lead to an
administrative discharge (e.g. for homosexuality) or to a medical discharge.”); BURELLI
& DALE, supra note 79, at 9-10 (explaining that a claim of homosexuality arising
during a stop-loss will be examined critically because skepticism may arise about
whether it is merely an attempt to avoid deployment or combat); see also Stop-loss
Facts, ARMY TIMES, June 14, 2004, at 11 (“Stop-loss does not affect most involuntary
separations or retirements, nor does it generally limit laws, regulations, or policies that
lead to involuntary separations, retirements or releases from active duty.”).
167. See KAPP, supra note 163, at 7 (asserting that a stop-loss order will not prevent
the separation of an individual from the armed forces if it results from homosexuality
or a medical discharge).
168. Bulletin from the Marine Admin., Expanded Stop Loss Policy for Force
Protection, MARADMIN 491/02, Sept. 13, 2002, available at http://www
.usmc.mil/maradmins/maradmin2000.nsf/maradmins?OpenForm&Start=6.196 (follow
“EXPANDED STOP LOSS POLICY FOR FORCE PROTECTION”).
169. See KAPP, supra note 163, at 7.
170. U.S. Army, Miscellaneous Policies, http://www.armyg1.army.mil/Military
Personnel/policy.asp (follow the hyperlinks below “Stop Loss” and “Matrixes”).
(providing the specific exemption regarding officers in either of these three branches,
which reads “Resignation for the good of the service due to homosexual conduct”). Air
Force and Navy regulations were not available from this website. Id.
171. See FORSCOM, supra note 89.
172. See Afghanistan Wakes, supra note 72 (noting that the spokesperson admitted
that the regulation was aimed at service members who say they are gay to avoid
service, which is prohibited by DADT in 10 U.S.C. § 654(e)). None of the regulations
include guidelines for determining if a service member is claiming to be gay to get out
of the military. Id.
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Nothing in 10 U.S.C. § 12302 mandates that separations under DADT
must be unaffected by a stop-loss order. The only articulated standard is
presidential determination that the member is “essential to the national
security of the United States.”173 As Commander-in-Chief, the president
has broad discretion to make that determination. And when the president’s
military strategy requires an increase in troop deployment in an allvolunteer force, he can call upon all willing and able service members
during this conflict.174 Therefore, the president could direct the Secretary
of Homeland Security to issue a stop-loss order that specifically applies to
separations under DADT regulations.175
Stop-loss orders are unpopular because they involuntarily extend active
tours of duty.176 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has called for an end to
the policy for both active and reserve forces for that reason.177 However,
given that most service members discharged under DADT are separated
involuntarily, a stop-loss policy that allows them to serve may not be as
unpopular.
C. Precedent Orders
While it may seem like a radical approach, past presidents have issued
executive orders for similar ends. Almost sixty years ago Harry Truman
signed an executive order ending racial segregation in the military and,
more recently, William Clinton instituted a nondiscrimination policy via an
executive order that protected homosexuals seeking security clearances.178
These two executive orders significantly changed the composition of the
military by explicitly ordering an end to discrimination.179 The order I
propose differs from those issued by Truman and Clinton in two ways.
First, the past orders did not suspend enforcement of an existing statute.180
173. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2007) (noting that the President may suspend any
provision of law separating any member of the armed forces).
174. See Lubold & Cox, supra note 164 (noting that stop-loss is one of the strategies
employed to retain troops when needed).
175. See Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,626 (Feb. 28, 2003)
(amending a 1990 order by President George W. Bush that originally delegated the
suspension authority to the Secretary of Transportation, and transferring that power to
the Secretary of Homeland Security).
176. See Lubold & Cox, supra note 164, at 18 (noting also that stop loss results in
many soldiers being retained past their planned retirement dates, which prompted
Defense Secretary Robert Gates to state that use of stop loss will be minimized).
177. See id.
178. See Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4,313, 4,313 (July 26, 1948); see also
Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,249 (Aug. 2, 1995).
179. See Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, at 40,249.
180. Executive orders have the same force and effect of law because they are the
result of delegated legislative authority. See Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg.
4,313, 4,313 (July 26, 1948); see also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY
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Second, they rested on nothing more than general constitutional authority,
rather than specific statutes.181
Prior to 1995, the Defense Department’s Industrial Security Clearance
Office (“DISCO”), which issued security clearances for employees of
Department of Defense contractors, subjected gay employees to heightened
security clearance checks.182 A 1987 case challenged this increased
scrutiny as a constitutional violation, and the federal district court found
the process unconstitutional.183 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that homosexuality was not a suspect class under equal protection
analysis and applying rational basis review, held the process
constitutional.184 Thereafter, in 1995, President Clinton issued an executive
order stating that the “United States Government does not discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or sexual
orientation in granting access to classified information.”185 Even more
specifically, “[n]o inference concerning the [access eligibility] standards in
this section may be raised solely on the basis of sexual orientation.”186
Clinton cited no authority for this order other than his general constitutional
authority and U.S. laws.187
Because the order affected executive
agencies,188 and the president has wide discretion to make regulations for
such agencies, he had the authority to act.189
President Truman’s 1948 order ending race discrimination in the armed
forces is an analogous precedent because it declared the presidential policy
that there “be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the
armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”190
LAW 44-45 (4th ed. 2007); Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders:
Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285,
297-301 (1983).
181. See Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4,313 (July 26, 1948); see also
Alexander, supra note 12, at 413.
182. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1364
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (adding that the Defense Department believed that homosexual
actions warranted expanded investigations of the applicants because such activity was
derogatory).
183. Id. at 1362.
184. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
Cir. 1990).
185. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,250 (Aug. 2, 1995).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 40,245 (declaring his power to make this order was based on the power
vested in him as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 40,253 (requiring “active oversight and continuing security education
and awareness programs to ensure effective implementation of this order”).
190. Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948) (establishing a
committee to oversee military practices to ensure that the president’s policy is
adequately implemented).
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Truman relied on his authority as president under the Constitution and U.S.
laws, citing his Commander-in-Chief authority as well.191
These two precedent orders demonstrate that the president has the legal
authority to end discrimination in the military via executive order, without
a specific statutory basis. The order I propose regarding DADT would
similarly end a discriminatory practice, albeit temporarily. The fact that
this order contradicts the president’s duty to enforce the law is ameliorated
by other statutory grants of power and the president’s broad discretion to
lead the armed forces.
D. Challenges to an Executive Order Lifting the Ban
Inevitably, the order would come under attack because it addresses a
controversial issue. A legal challenge raises complex questions regarding
its form and who has standing to get into court. The president has
conflicting authority. The Constitution mandates that the president
faithfully execute the laws,192 and DADT is a valid law. Additionally,
Congress explicitly delegated certain powers to the president regarding
military matters.
By issuing an executive order suspending the
enforcement of DADT, the president appears to violate his constitutional
duty. However, courts have interpreted the Commander-in-Chief powers
broadly to give the president wide discretion regarding military strategy
and tactics during conflicts.193 These laws were designed to give the
Commander-in-Chief the flexibility needed to make decisions about
managing a war.194 DADT was written and passed during peacetime, but
the country is now embroiled in a foreign civil war with no end in sight.
Given the different circumstances between 1993 and the present, there may
be acceptance of the president’s temporary exercise of authority to suspend
this law. These factors make the order very likely to survive an attack.
This section briefly explores some of the potential challenges.
There are at least three potential claims that can be brought against the
Executive after it issues the order suspending DADT separations.195 One
possibility is that a member of Congress would attack the order as
unconstitutional on its face. In the alternative, a Congressperson might
demand a writ of mandamus, calling on the president to enforce DADT.

191. Id.
192. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
193. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that

the President’s tactical and strategic military decisions constituted nonjusticiable
political questions).
194. See id.
195. The plaintiff could name as defendant the president or the Secretary or
Secretaries of the service issuing the implementing regulations.
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The third possibility is that a homophobic soldier—a service member who
is aware of a gay soldier in his or her unit and claims that unit cohesion has
diminished as a result—might try to prevent the order from taking effect
through an injunction.
Any of these plaintiffs likely would have standing problems. The three
main standing requirements are injury in fact, a causal connection, and
redressability.196 In addition, “when the plaintiff is not himself the object
of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not
precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”197
It is unlikely that a Member of Congress could allege injury in fact. The
Supreme Court ruled in Raines v. Bird that legislators may not sue in their
institutional capacity unless their votes have been “completely nullified” by
allegedly illegal action.198 In this instance, Congress could pass legislation
through the bicameral process that would override the executive order.
Accordingly, the legislator’s vote would not be nullified by the order and
the legislator would not have standing.199
E. Homophobic Soldier Hypothetical
The homophobic soldier might have a better chance at establishing
standing, though the challenge is still unlikely to succeed. The soldier
would be able to show a causal connection between the executive order and
the gay soldier remaining in the unit. He could also demonstrate that the
issue would be redressed by an injunction preventing the order from taking
effect. The homophobic soldier may be able to show injury in fact. That
requirement is met only by a showing of concrete and particularized injury
that is actual or imminent and not merely conjectural.200 While there is no
case directly on point, the holding in Pietsch v. Bush201 is instructive. In
that case, a private citizen sued the president and the Secretary of Defense,
among others, to stop military actions in the first Persian Gulf War.202 The
court held that the plaintiff had no standing because he had not “alleged a
‘distinct and palpable’ injury, in fact, that he suffers by reason of the
196.
197.
198.
199.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
Id. at 562.
See 521 U.S. 791, 814, 823 (1997).
The Member of Congress’s challenge would also likely fail the doctrine of
ripeness for the same reason. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (D.D.C. 1990)
(noting that “[j]udicial restraint must, of course, be even further enhanced when the
issue is one . . . on which the other two branches may be deeply divided”). An issue is
not ripe “unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority.” Id. at 1150. Here, Congress would have the chance to assert its
constitutional authority by repealing the executive order through the bicameral process.
200. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
201. 755 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
202. Id. at 62-63.
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activities in the Persian Gulf.203 The court stated that the “[p]laintiff’s
contention that he is being made ‘AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER
AGAINST HIS WILL,’ and . . . that this fact is causing him severe
emotional distress, is too abstract to amount to a ‘case or controversy’
under Article III, Section 2.”204 The Pietsch court’s finding of no standing
rested in part on the fact that the plaintiff was not in the military. Thus,
Pietsch seems to suggest that a service member directly affected by a
deployment order might have a better chance at establishing standing.
However, even if a plaintiff obtained standing, the court could rule the
issue a nonjusticiable political question and dismiss it with prejudice, as the
D.C. District court did in Ange.205
Separation of powers issues dictate that the judiciary remove itself from
purely political questions, which it has neither the authority nor the
expertise to address.206 The court in Ange listed numerous elements—any
one of which is sufficient—that are necessary to invoke this doctrine:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.207
The political question doctrine is broad and would likely apply in the
homophobic soldier hypothetical for at least two reasons. The Constitution
commits power to regulate the armed forces to Congress and the
Executive.208 The court would not be able to resolve the issue without
making a policy determination about allowing homosexuals to serve in the
military. Courts reviewing DADT have found that the question was not

203. Id. at 66.
204. Id.
205. See id. at 515 (explaining the dismissal as resting upon the constitutional

delegation of authority to the executive and legislative branches and the court’s concern
about intruding into those realms).
206. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
207. Ange, 752 F. Supp. at 512.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 12 (giving the right to raise and support Armies to
Congress); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the President to be Commander-inChief of the Army and Navy).
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one to be resolved by judicial discretion.209 In another case from the
Vietnam War era, a service member challenged the enforcement of a
presidential directive ordering the Secretary of Defense and service
secretaries to mine the ports and harbors of North Vietnam.210 The Second
Circuit held that the executive’s actions presented a nonjusticiable political
question because there was a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards to evaluate whether they were “merely a new tactical
approach within a continuing strategic plan.”211 Lifting the ban on gay
service members is arguably a tactical approach implementing the
president’s strategic plan to increase troop levels in Iraq. Therefore, no
standards to evaluate the action likely exist here, either.
It is likely, therefore, that courts would dismiss any challenge to my
proposed executive order, even if a plaintiff could get standing. It is
important here to note that standing is a narrower basis for dismissal than
the political question doctrine. Standing requirements go to the fitness of a
particular plaintiff to present a case against the defendant, allowing the
court to avoid addressing the merits of a claim.212 Thus, another plaintiff,
could establish standing, to sue on the same issue. In contrast, a dismissal
due to nonjusticiability disallows a court from hearing the issue at all.213
Ultimately, the executive order would be immune to any challenge
because it is grounded on clear statutory authority. Congress delegated the
power to suspend any provision of law relating to the separation of
members of the armed forces to the president if he determines the
suspension to be essential to national security.214 Virtually every plaintiff
would have difficulty establishing standing. In addition, deference by the
courts “to military-related judgments . . . has been the basis for rejections to
a variety of challenges to Congressional and Executive decisions in the
military domain.”215 Alternatively, a court likely could invoke the political
209. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (holding that rational basis review in equal protection
analysis does not permit courts to pass judgment on the logic behind Congress’
constitutional choices).
210. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147 (2d Cir. 1973).
211. Id. at 1155.
212. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (implying that if
standing is not found, then the court will not proceed to judge the case on its merits,
and further noting the specific requirements for standing as injury in fact, a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct, and redressability).
213. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that inquiry
into presidential deployment orders constitutes a nonjusticiable political question and
therefore dismissing the plaintiff’s claims).
214. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (2001).
215. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 633 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting many
examples of other challenges that courts have dismissed, including a challenge of the
president’s power to define military death penalty factors and Congress’ authority to
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question doctrine and dismiss the case on that ground.
F. The Temporary Nature of an Executive Order
A central problem with this proposal remains. Executive orders neither
can nor should last indefinitely, especially orders that suspend the
enforcement of laws. Thus, this temporary measure only protects gay
service members during times of conflict. For example, the order to
suspend separations of commissioned officers under the law could last until
one year after the national emergency ends.216 The heinous and
hypocritical practice of subsequently discharging homosexual members of
the armed forces when combat subsides might continue. The temporary
nature of the measures also does not address the problem of hiding sexual
orientation. If gay service members were not guaranteed permanent
protection, they have no reason to “come out.”
In the long run, however, allowing gay soldiers to serve would have a
positive effect. Although the military may not be the most appropriate
place for social experiments,217 the relatively painless integration of both
racial minorities and women in the military bodes well for successfully
integrating homosexuals. Assuming the vast majority of gay service
members would continue to serve the country honorably and without
deteriorating unit performance, as they currently do, the experience could
provide evidence that the military can function under suspended
enforcement of DADT. If the order were to remain in effect for several
years—which is likely considering the open-ended nature of the global war
on terror—the evidence would strongly undermine the last remaining
justification for the ban. Overall, it could provide political cover for
Congress to quietly repeal the law even before the national emergency
terminated.
V. CONCLUSION
The Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2007 (“MREA”) was
referred to the House Subcommittee on Military Personnel at the end of
March. It is hard to predict what chance of success the MREA has, but it is
clear that DADT will remain a topic for public debate throughout the 2008
presidential campaign season. In two early, televised debates in New
Hampshire, the eight candidates for the Democratic nomination indicated
order the National Guard into active duty, which implies that, due to the significant
deference afforded to legislative and executive decisions affecting the military, similar
challenges would likely be dismissed as well).
216. See supra note 158 and accompanying text; see also 10 U.S.C. § 123(b).
217. S. REP. NO. 103-112, § 263, at 280 (1993) (noting that “training troops to
change social attitudes is a formidable task”).
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that they would repeal DADT, while all ten of the Republicans seeking
their party’s nomination expressed support for the law.218 One can only
speculate whether the country’s respect and support for those who wish to
serve in an unpopular war will extend to gay men and women.
The current DADT debate arises in an atmosphere of public hostility to
another controversial gay rights issue—marriage. Thirteen states in 2004,
and seven states in 2006, passed amendments to their state constitutions
defining marriage as a union of one man and one woman, which brings the
total to twenty-six states.219 The current administration enthusiastically
supports the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines marriage as a “legal
union between one man and one woman,”220 and would like to see such
language added to the federal Constitution.221 Therefore, the President’s
and the Republican party’s outspoken stands against gay rights portend a
potentially fierce fight against granting any gay rights in the next two years.
Given the fairly hostile reception to Mr. Bush’s Iraq policies and falling
public support for the war, the administration may simply ignore the
MREA instead of actively opposing it. It is safe to assume that this
administration would not even consider issuing an executive order that
would effectively suspend DADT, if the MREA did not pass. Therefore, it
may be a strategy for the next president to deploy.

218. See Carolyn Lochhead, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Battle Brews, S.F. CHRON.,
June 14, 2007, at A4; Robin Toner, For “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Split on Party Lines,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at A1.
219. CNN Same Sex Marriage Bans Winning on State Ballots, Nov. 3, 2004,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/ballot.samesex.marriage/
index.html (noting that eleven states passed anti-gay-marriage constitutional
amendments in the November election and two other states passed them earlier in
2004); see also Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, Sept. 19,
2007, available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_prohibit_20070919.pdf;
Monica Davey, Liberals Find Ray of Hope on Ballet Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2006, at P16 (noting that in the 2006 election, Arizona voters rejected a constitutional
amendment to restrict marriage to one man and one woman, which was the first
rejection of such a measure in the twenty eight state elections that have considered the
issue since 1998). Arizona, however, has a statutory ban on gay unions. Id.
220. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 7, 110 Stat. 2419-20 (1996)
(defining spouse to only refer to someone of the opposite sex who is a husband or
wife).
221. President George W. Bush, President Calls for Constitutional Amendment
Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html.
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